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The price of a barrel of crude oil 
doubled within a few months last year. 
Although prices have been easing lately, 
for those who paid more than $3 for a 
gallon of gas, the memory is not likely 
to fade quickly. But worries about 
higher gas prices don’t end at the pump. 
Oil price shocks—sudden and sharp 
increases in the price of oil and its 
derivatives like gasoline—are associated 
in the popular mindset with an unavoid­
able descent into inflation. Ask just 
about anyone about the inflation of the 
1970s, for example, and they’re likely 
to associate it with the oil crisis that 
occurred early in the decade. 
Many economists have also held the 
view that oil shocks can lead to 
inflation—although not directly or 
inevitably, but because of the way 
monetary policy responds when there 
is a shock. 
What do the latest round of oil-price 
increases bode for inflation? We trace 
the path of an oil shock through all 
sectors of the U.S. economy and demon­
strate that such shocks do not cause 
inflation. They can, however, cause 
other unpleasant economic repercus­
sions. We identify the sectors that suffer 
the highest long-run price increases after 
an oil shock and find that they are 
among the most capital-intensive in the 
economy, suggesting that an oil shock 
may actually increase the relative prof­
itability of capital in a few sectors that 
can pass increased costs onto con­
sumers. One reassuring result of our 
analysis is that it seems likely that our 
economy may now be less dependent 
on oil, so that this time around, the 
consequences of an oil shock may be 
less severe. 
■ Guilt by Association 
Figure 1 presents some historical data on 
oil prices and inflation in the United 
States. A cursory glance at the figure 
suggests that a doubling of oil prices 
leads to double-digit price increases. It’s 
no wonder people associate oil shocks 
with inflation. 
But an oil price shock is an increase in 
the real price of a commodity that will 
be passed on to other sectors of the econ­
omy. Since the shock is a one-time 
increase in the price of oil, by definition 
it cannot be considered inflationary. 
Inflation, instead, is a persistent rise in 
prices, sustained year after year. Such a 
persistent rise can only be caused by the 
monetary authority, when it creates too 
much money.
It is possible that the Fed has responded 
to past oil shocks by creating inflation— 
intentionally, to ease the blow of the oil 
shock—or accidentally, because the oil 
shock distorted information about how 
much money the economy needed. 
Some economists argue that is the case. 
But that oil price shocks have been 
viewed as inflationary is really guilt by 
association. 
To be sure, even if an oil price shock 
doesn’t cause inflation, the consequences 
of one can be severe. Because so many 
other commodities depend on oil for their 
manufacture or distribution, an oil shock 
can ripple through the economy, raising 
the prices of many goods and services. 
Those higher prices, in turn, can cause 
people hardship and force adjustments 
elsewhere in the economy. 
Oil price shocks do not cause infla­
tion, no matter how close the connec­
tion seems to be in our practical expe­
rience. But they can cause significant 
price increases throughout the econ­
omy. Tracing the way a sharp 
increase in the price of crude oil 
affects prices in various industrial 
sectors of the U.S. economy suggests 
how big these increases are. Fortu­
nately, our economy seems better 
prepared now to weather such shocks 
than in the 1970s and 1980s. 
■ Commodity Price Effects 
What are the aggregate price effects of 
an oil shock, isolated from the monetary 
policy response? To answer that ques­
tion, we follow the price effects of a 
shock as it moves through individual 
sectors of the U.S. economy, using a 
detailed input–output table. In principle, 
this table shows how much input various 
industry sectors require from other sec­
tors to produce their output. The auto­
mobile sector, for example, might 
require material from the steel sector 
amounting to 30 percent of the total cost 
of producing a car, material from the 
plastics sector amounting to 20 percent 
of the total, and so on. 
We base our analysis on the 2003 
input–output table for the U.S. econ­
omy. It is compiled by the Commerce 
Department’s Bureau of Economic 
Analysis and based on detailed bench­
mark data from 1997 and updated annu­
ally. The version we use divides the 
American economy into 61 sectors, 
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FIGURE 1 HISTORICAL OIL PRICES AND INFLATION 
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disaggregating it into 19 manufacturing 
sectors and 35 service sectors. The 
remaining 7 sectors include agriculture, 
mining, utilities, and construction. For 
each sector, the data give the cost of 
the inputs from each of the 61 sectors 
needed to produce a dollar’s worth 
of output. 
We consider the effect of a 100 percent 
increase in the price of oil, equivalent to 
the price of a barrel of crude going from 
$30 to $60. We trace the effect of this 
price increase through the 61 sectors, 
calculating the resulting price increases 
at two points in time, in all of the sectors 
that use oil. 
We designated the two points in time 
round 1 and round 2. A round is the time 
it takes for the typical firm to set a new 
price in response to the rise in the world 
price of crude; we think of a round as 
the time it takes for increased costs to 
be passed on to consumers. Different 
industries have different patterns of 
posting prices. In those sectors where 
there is a strong direct link between 
output and oil input, such as gasoline 
at the pump, we would expect this 
response to be almost immediate. In 
other sectors, the increases would be 
more gradual. As a rough gauge, we 
would expect the full long-run price 
increases to materialize in one year. 
Some industries change posted prices 
every day, and other do so very infre­
quently. A conservative assumption is 
that prices change once a quarter; in our 
numerical analysis, the full effects of a 
price shock pass through the economy 
almost completely within four rounds. 
An oil price increase means higher costs 
for sectors that use this commodity as an 
input. These costs are passed on to other 
sectors that may not use oil directly. To 
keep our analysis simple, we concentrate 
on price effects only. Thus we assume 
output and employment stay the same, 
and by doing so don’t consider the effect 
an oil shock might have on either. We 
also assume the shock will have no effect 
on personal incomes. 
In reality, output would likely decline in 
those sectors whose prices have risen 
substantially, because demand will fall 
as people find substitutes that cost less. 
If labor markets do not adjust quickly to 
sector-specific shifts in production, or if 
the income effects of an oil shock are 
strong, then aggregate output and 
employment will be affected. 
Economists don’t yet know for sure 
which sectors could find substitutes for 
oil or how quickly. Some suggest capital 
is a general substitute for oil in the pro­
duction processes of many sectors of the 
economy. In other words, firms can 
invest in energy-efficient equipment to 
reduce their dependence on oil, but 
changing established techniques of pro­
duction may take many years (see Atke­
son and Kehoe, 1999). Our empirical 
analysis—using input–output tables with 
benchmarks two decades apart—is con­
sistent with their model. 
Table 1 reports the eight sectors that have 
the highest long-run price increases. 
Here we see the concentration in the 
transportation sector. However, since 
fuel costs are directly or indirectly a 
small part of almost every economic 
activity, in the long run all sectors show 
some price increase. 
To understand the long-run effects, 
it is useful to review the logic of an 
input–output matrix. When the economy 
produces a final good, it uses many 
intermediate inputs. Each of these inputs 
in turn uses many other inputs, and 
those inputs must also be produced. An 
input–output table gives precise mea­
sures of this iterative process, and the 
long-run effect summarizes the full cost 
increases. These cost increases summa­
rize the long-run effects of the oil shock 
in an economy that uses existing pro­
duction techniques—in 2025, it is likely 
that the future economy will be even 
less dependent on energy and will be 
able to weather coming oil price shocks 
even more readily. 
The iterative process that leads from the 
oil shock to overall higher prices in the 
long run is not inflationary; it represents 
a rise in the relative price of commodi­
ties, holding factor prices constant. The 
price of oil-dependent sectors is rising 
relative to those sectors which are less 
reliant on oil, either directly or indi­
rectly. For example, the sectors with the 
lowest price increase in 2003 include 
insurance and financial services and 
computer systems design. Goods and 
services produced in these sectors are 
now relatively cheaper. 
To summarize the overall effect, we 
construct a weighted average of the 
individual sectors based on the share of 
each sector’s output in final consump­
tion. This aggregate effect is shown in 
the final row of table 1. A 100 percent 
increase in the price of crude oil, hold­
ing factor prices constant, translates into 
only a 3.2 percent price increase in the 
typical basket of consumption goods. 
Since unrefined oil itself is not a con­
sumer good, the oil price shock is 
passed through indirectly in the prices 
of many other goods and services. Of 
course, an important consumption good 
is refined oil in the form of gasoline, 
which has a long-run price increase of 
over 83 percent, but has a weight of only 
1.3 percent in the national consumption 
basket. (Since our weights are based on 
the input–output matrix, they do not 
  
 
FIGURE 1 COMMODITY PRICE EFFECTS 
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portfolios. But the same oil price shock 
puts downward pressure on real wages. 
We also analyzed how the economy in 
1982 would have reacted to the same 
kind of long-run price changes. In that 
case, the real wage falls and the real 
interest rate rises, but the effects were 
less pronounced in the data from the 
table benchmarked in 1982.  
■ It Still Hurts, but Maybe 
Aggregate price increase 1.4% 3.2% 
correspond exactly to those used in the 
well-publicized Consumer Price Index 
constructed by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and based on household 
spending. For example, the weight of 
gasoline in the CPI is about 4 percent.) 
Our approach amounts to a worst-case 
scenario. Since we assume perfect com­
petition in every sector, higher costs are 
passed on completely as higher prices. 
In the long run, one way the economy 
adjusts to a permanently higher real 
price of oil is by adopting less oil-
intensive production techniques. 
Certainly, this has happened before. In 
1982, the same oil price shock modeled 
here would have resulted in an overall 
price increase of about 7 percent. The 
U.S. economy has certainly become 
less oil dependent by this measure. 
Sharp price increases in sectors that 
were heavily dependent on oil in 1982 
no doubt contributed to a shift of pro­
duction into less oil-intensive activities. 
By 2003, the economy could sustain an 
oil price shock with a lower overall 
impact on prices. 
■ Factor Price Effects 
The analysis so far has held fixed the 
combinations of intermediate goods and 
also the factors of production that go 
into producing final output in each 
sector. This amounts to assuming that 
producers will continue to use the same 
intermediate inputs no matter how 
expensive they get. But a permanent 
increase in the price of crude oil will 
no doubt change how the economy pro­
duces many goods. It will also change 
the mix of factors of production that are 
used in each sector. 
What effect will an oil price shock have 
on the amount of input various industry 
sectors require from other sectors? To 
answer that question, we analyzed how 
the “factor prices” in the input–output 
table changed over time. 
Gross domestic product is measured as 
the total value of output produced for 
final demand or as the total value added 
by all the factors of production in the 
economy. The input–output table shows 
spending on intermediate inputs and 
also factor payments in each sector. 
Value added is just the value of total 
output net of the costs of intermediate 
inputs. In the input–output data, value 
added consists of compensation of 
employees, indirect taxes, and gross 
operating surplus. We will refer to com­
pensation of employees as wages, and 
gross operating surplus as payments to 
capital. Payments to capital determine 
the rate of return of capital, or what 
economists often refer to as the real 
interest rate. 
Using new statistical techniques 
(described in detail in Fisher and May 
2006), we estimate with regression 
analysis the factor-price changes that 
best explain the pattern of price changes 
observed in the input–output tables after 
an oil shock. Our analysis indicates that 
an oil price shock tends to raise the real 
return on capital, lower the real wage, 
and raise receipts from indirect busi­
nesses taxes. The effect that an oil price 
shock has on wages explains an impor­
tant aspect of a real price change: Not 
every single price in the economy can 
increase in real terms. Thus some prices 
must be pushed down. We are not 
accustomed to thinking about real 
wages as a price, but the real wage is 
indeed the opportunity cost of one’s free 
time. Thus the owners of capital— 
people in the national economy who 
have positive net wealth—will find 
solace in the fact that an oil price shock 
tends to increase the income from their 
Less So 
Oil price shocks often take the blame 
for stagflation. While we have chosen 
not to examine the output effects of 
such a shock, we are adamant that 
the shock in itself is not inflationary. 
Since price increases vary substantially 
across sectors, a more accurate descrip­
tion of an oil price shock is that it 
causes a change in relative prices, with 
those industries that use oil intensively 
experiencing the highest relative price 
increases. Because the sectors that 
experience the highest long-run price 
increases are among the most capital-
intensive in the economy, the rate of 
return to capital tends to rise and 
economywide wages are liable to fall. 
Even under the worst-case scenario, 
though, the economy seems to be in a 
better position to accommodate an oil 
price shock than before 2000. If the 
price of oil doubles, the one-time 
increase in commodity prices due to the 
oil increase alone averages around 3 per­
cent, which is substantially less than 
what would have occurred in 1982. 
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